Abstract-This paper introduces a design system analysis and game theory for the architectural equilibrium which guarantees t system being designed and its environment af We introduce multi-objective optimization and their links with systems engineering thro models. While Pareto optimality is used architectures and to support independent equilibrium is used to find out architectural e support interdependent decisions. This appro previously in a case study.
INTRODUCTION
The integration of a new system in an disrupt the stability of this environment and unexpected events, which in turn can affect integration. This integration becomes more c complexity of the system of interest (SOI) an
To address this problem, we propose in t approach based on system analysis and gam identification of architectural equilibrium wh stability of the SOI and its environment aft We have demonstrated this assertion using a related to electric vehicles [1] [2] . We rely on to understanding the system environment an involved during the SOI`s life cycle. The o global balances between external systems ( would meet their needs (would satisfy their into account feasibility constraints (econom regulatory, societal, etc.) This balance (equili a better integration of the SOI and the environment. In order to find this equilibr game model as defined in game theory. Solv finding equilibrium allow to anticipate chang environment (departure or arrival of a sta changing needs or constraints, etc.)
A game as defined in game theory i function which matches for each possible strategies played by N players, an outcome outcome is often represented -especia examples -by the gain of each player [3] . of decision-makers and priority ives influence the choice of O problem. The author [4] , for two categories: methods with dvance (a priori preferences) and ori preferences). The reader may methods in [6] , [7] and [8] In other words, a point is a Weakly Paret is not another point that enhances all ob simultaneously. A point is a Pareto optimu another point that improves at least one obj the expense of another objective function.
However, the preferences of decision mak quantify and depend on several param organizations. Some decision problems in systems engineering can be seen as decisi single agent (one independent decision make many interdependent stakeholders around th engineers, managers, project managers, pr etc.) may have different preferences difficu often difficult to converge [9] . In addition, system where many external stakeholders are expecting some added value, the d interdependent. Thus, we discuss in the foll the contribution of game theory and Nas addressing such problems.
III. WHY GAME THEORY
Game theory is a rational decision theo interdependent agents, that is to say, whic other and are aware of these reciprocal influ are interactive decision situations in which u each individual depends on the decisions of [10] .
A. Definitions
Some definitions in this section are adap ingredients of a game are a list of n individu aiming to maximize an objective function o given the information they have (rationality players, a rational player is the one who gains). We then have n sets, one set by elements are called strategies. In addit mathematical function which matches to ea combinations of strategies available to N play the game. This outcome is often represented numerical examples -by the gain of each solution of the game is a combination of s associated gains for each player accordingly.
Formally, we have a game with n play has a set S i of strategies. s=(s 1 ,…,s n ) is strategic choices of n players where s 1 is the gain of the player i whe any player i =1,2,…,n.
The strategies can be pure mixed strategies (for a given p probability p 1 ). The solution of may not be in the real world, (float) to quantify the gain (eve The criterion for comparing th alternatives is that of expecte expected gains of pure-strategi by the probabilities chosen strategies).
We can have a complete knows all the possible outcome of the other players) and an (players assign a priori probab game and the strategies of the o zero-sum when the sum of gain zero sum game can be reduced a fictitious player.
Unlike a non-cooperative g players can create coalitions strategies to play.) A dominant has a strategy that gives him th strategies of the other players.
Finally, we talk about an eq may be the end point of a proc their choices and no one regrets the other players. The Nash eq strategies is finite (bounded) a strategies, then the game has solution.
B. Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is a ver theory (name of John F. Nash 1994. He introduced the concep equilibrium describes an outc player has an incentive to c strategies of the other players. equilibrium can be given as foll Let`s define a no-cooper s * =(s *1 ,…,s *n ) a combination players where s *1 is the strateg the strategic choice of the play П i (s *1 ,…,s *n ) the gain of the where i can be any player i =1,2 Nash Equilibrium is forma A combination of strateg Nash equilibrium if П i (s *1 ,…,s *i ,…,s *n ) ≥ П i (s and each player i. S i is the set o en s is selected, where i can be e strategies (no probability) or pure strategy s 1 , we associate a f the game with mixed strategies we can imagine a real number en if it does not exist in reality). he gains in the various possible ed utility, which is to take the ies obtained by weighting them by the players (their mixed information game (each player es of the game and the strategies incomplete information game bilities on the outcomes of the other players). The game can be ns of all players is zero. A nonto a zero-sum game by creating game, in a cooperative game the (agreements on the choice of t strategy of a player exists if he he maximum gains whatever the quilibrium (a point of rest, which cess) when the players announce s his choice given the choices of quilibrium is an example. If all and the game can include mixed at least one Nash equilibrium ry important concept in game h, Nobel Prize in Economics in pt of equilibrium in 1951). Nash ome of the game in which no change his strategy given the The formal description of Nash lows [11] :
ative game with n player and of strategic choices of these n gic choice of the player 1, s *2 is yer 2 and so on. In addition, let player i when s * is selected, 2,…,n. ally defined as follows: gic choices s * =(s *1 ,…,s *n ) is a s *1 ,…,s i ,…,s *n ) for each s i in S i of strategies of the player i. In summary, s *i is the best strategy of player i when all the other players choose their strategies s * .
In this work, we are interested in studying non-cooperative games (the players cannot talk to each other and sign preferential contracts (particularly because of anti-trust laws prohibiting businesses to communicate with each other to enter into agreements, etc. [11] ))
C. Link with systems engineering
As explained previously, one of the first stages of a systems engineering approach is the modeling of the SOI`s environment. The purpose of this step is to define the interactions between the SOI with the external systems with which it interacts in order to anticipate the evolution of an external system (or several) that could affect other systems. This step clarifies the external interfaces of the SOI before diving in optimizing its internal architectures. Note that the environment modeling phase is critical. Forgetting an external system could jeopardize the design of the SOI. Indeed, each external system has its own expectations, needs or constraints, throughout the life cycle of the system, the designer should anticipate and satisfy. However, these needs are often interrelated and sometimes antagonistic. In order to maximize the profits related to the SOI, each stakeholder has strategies. Thus, we arrive at a situation where the designer must look for equilibrium for the purpose of stability. This architectural equilibrium should more or less satisfy all these stakeholders and ensure a stable environment throughout the SOI's life cycle.
By taking the vocabulary of the systems engineering and game theory, we assume that each stakeholder can be considered as a player around the SOI and he is rational. Each player has his own strategies to maximize his gains, which account for the satisfaction of his own needs. However, the designer must try to best satisfy the stakeholders (players). At the same time, the designer should find out an architectural equilibrium, meaning that it guarantees the stability of the environment throughout the cycle life of the SOI and the life cycles of all the stakeholders. Finally, we can say that the predesign of this architectural equilibrium is a solution of a game where the stakeholders are the players. If we consider that the stakeholders can build coalitions in the sense that they combine their choice of strategies, it is called cooperative game. Otherwise, it is in a non-cooperative game.
The use of game theory in the context of systems engineering and its relation to design architectural frameworks is mentioned in [12] . Indeed, the authors propose a framework called Engineering Systems Multiple-Domain Matrix (ES-MDM). The framework is based on the use of several different areas (environmental, social, functional, technical, process) and matrices (designer / decision maker, stakeholder, objectives, functions, objects, activities). Then the authors propose to cross the matrices together and in different areas, for example, the stakeholder matrix about a SOI representing the social field, Stakeholders are human entities that contribute to the objectives of the system and control system components. The extent of their control system defines the scope of the system. For the identification of stakeholders in a given system, it is useful to ask the following questions (cf. Rechtin and Maier (2000) in [12] ): Who benefits? Who pays? Who supplies? And who loses? Then, the authors propose a combination of matrices, such as that of stakeholders with those goals. Each stakeholder has his own objectives, and other stakeholders can declare their support, opposition or indifference. This is used to store information about the positions of the various stakeholders that can be used in a game model to analyze strategies and to align their interests (cf. Dixit and Skeath (2003) in [12] ) on a tutorial on game theory and applications in the real world.)
D. Proposed approach
In our approach, we propose the following interdependence analysis process to identify an architectural equilibrium: 
IV. DISCUSSION
One difficulty in finding an architectural equilibrium is that it is not easy to empirically observe the emergence of behavior consistent with a mixed strategy. Indeed, in that case, there is no strict incentive that an actor plays the equilibrium strategy, the use of random strategies implies the use of assumptions on the expected utility and assumptions of risk [10] . Another difficulty in solving games is related to the fact that the information can be complete or incomplete. It is not easy for a player to know all the strategies of other players without contracts for cooperation. In addition, sometimes, it is very difficult to formalize gains functions (we can even be in front of non-formalized gains, such as brand image where the notion of perception is important, etc.) We can also consider the emergence of new issues that brings us clearly in decisions in uncertain situations. However, building such models helps greatly in finding architectural equilibriums, or at least approaching them. The example we presented in [1] related to electric vehicles is instructive.
Indeed, to designing complex industrial system, we believe that two types of optimization models are complementary and necessary. These models take into account the types of decisions that come into play in the choice of solutions.
а Pareto Optimality for finding the best architectural solutions of an SOI given the needs and constraints of the stakeholders / external systems. These solutions correspond to different options or alternatives of the system architectures. Pareto Optimality is useful for "independent" decisions in the sense that these decisions depend only on the choices (or preferences) as defined by the SOI designer. The decision space related to these decisions is a set of endogenous factors.
а Nash equilibrium for finding the best equilibrium between the stakeholders surrounding the SOI. The results correspond to different architectural equilibrium. The equilibrium models are useful for "interdependent" decisions, where the decision space contains endogenous and exogenous factors, which depend not only on the SOI designer, but also on other stakeholders.
Finally, we can consider that architectural equilibrium of a given system has an impact on the design, therefore on the independent decisions. The architectural equilibrium gives the first orientations that are made during the design process. Some preliminary design constraints result from the choice of the architectural equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the contribution of game theory in finding architectural equilibrium, in the context of complex systems engineering. Indeed, for interdependent decisions of different stakeholders involved during the lifecycle of a given system, the concept of equilibrium is important. An architectural equilibrium of the SOI guarantees a better integration, stability of its environment and the satisfaction of all the stakeholders. This assertion is shown by a practical example related to the market of electric vehicles in [1] [2] . Many factors may contribute to the success of electric vehicles, which do not necessarily depend on the car manufacturers but also on other stakeholders such as energy suppliers, local authorities, governments, etc.
